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Introduction
Today, terrorism takes many forms. However, the rise of the selfradicalized lone wolf terrorist has created an increasing dilemma in today’s
security environment. This type of emerging terrorism is increasingly found
among right-wing reactionaries and religiously radicalized jihadists. With
increasingly effective security environments, leaderless resistance has emerged as
a threat and tactic facilitated by the internet and other modern information outlets.
The unabomber, Oklahoma City bomber, Fort Hood and Oslo assailants are
examples of this new form of terrorist. Through the development of a
sociologically informed typology that categorizes lone wolf terrorism in terms of
motivation, extent of radicalization, form, and risk-awareness, a more relevant
understanding of this type of non-normative behavior is proposed.
Terrorism, as a social construct, takes place within a given historical and social
context (Schmid:1992). In 1999, the United States Department of State (Title 22, U.S.
Code section 2656f(d)) defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents,
usually intended to influence an audience.” As a complex phenomenon, however,
numerous attempts have been made to identify types of terrorism based upon the kinds of
goals pursued, the types of acts manifested, the motivations for these acts, the levels of
organizational hierarchy encountered, and the social and psychological profiles of
participants (Bates, 2011). Since the early Jewish Zealots, the Ismaili Assassins, the
Viking beserkers, and the bomb-throwing anarchists of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, terrorism has emerged as both a tool and tactic in military, political, economic
and religious struggles (Poland, 1968, White, 2002). O’Connor (2011) lists the many selfpreferred and public names under which terrorists have operated. These labels have
included avengers, crusaders, defenders, dissidents, extremists, fanatics, fighters,
guerillas, insurgents, insurrectionists, liberators, lunatics, nationalists, radicals,
revolutionaries, separatists and soldiers.
Typologies of Terrorism
As a complex form of non-normative behavior, terrorism can take many forms,
and a number of typologies have been promoted. In 1976, a behavioral categorization of
criminals, crazies and crusaders was suggested by Hacker as types of terrorists (Hacker,
1976). Hacker (1976) also introduced the categories of terrorism from “above” and from
“below” to differentiate whether terrorism was utilized in the acquisition or exercise of
political power.
The social and psychological profile of terrorists was addressed by Hudson (1999)
in the late 1990s. This seminal work analyzed the growing threat of terrorism from a
variety of approaches, including political, organizational, physiological, psychological
and multi-causal perspectives and remains one of the most complete examinations,
including case studies of terrorist groups and individual terrorists.
Other typologies have classified terrorism in terms of place (Hess and Kalb, 2003)
(domestic, international, non-state, state-sponsored and internecine) or purpose (political,
non-political, quasi-terrorism, limited political and official/state). In addition, Combs
(2003) categorized terrorism by the type of target (mass terror, dynastic terror, random
terror, focused random terror and tactical terror) and O’Connor (2011) in terms of the
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underlying issues (revolutionary, political, nationalist, cause-based, environmental, statesponsored, nuclear and genocide).
Because of their role in protection of significant public officials, the U.S. Secret
Service utilizes a five-fold typology of terrorist types: crusaders, political terrorists,
anarchists, religious fanatics, and criminals (White, 2012). The National Advisory
Council on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals’ typology of terrorism (1976) included
civil disorder, political terrorism, non-political terrorism, quasi-terrorism, limited political
terrorism and official or state terrorism.
More recently, The U.S. Army (2007) developed a typology of terrorism based
upon a group’s goals and objectives. Specifically, they categorized terrorists and terrorist
groups in terms of motivational characteristics: separatist, ethnocentric, nationalistic, and
revolutionary. In addition, they analyzed terrorist group structures as either hierarchical
or networked command structures.
Jonathon White (2012), in training a variety of U.S. government military and
security personnel, developed a typology of terrorism which employs a multidimensional perspective measuring levels of violence, the relative size of the threat from
individual to large scale group, and the form of organizational structure. This typology of
terrorism facilitates the identification of different types of threats as well as different
types of perpetrators who are associated with conflict manifested in environments
ranging from criminal through civil disorder, but not yet a tactical component of guerrilla
warfare (Kilcullen, 2009).
Lone Wolf Terrorism
Obviously, terrorism is a very complex phenomenon and has been approached
from a variety of perspectives. Though not a new form of terrorism, the emergence of the
lone wolf terrorist increasingly has been seen a growing threat to America. In February
2010 during a homeland security review to Congress, both the Director of the FBI and the
Director of the CIA indicated that lone wolf terrorism was emerging as a major concern.
Then CIA Director Leon Panetta noted, “It’s the lone wolf strategy that I think we have
to pay attention to as the main threat to this country.” (Sage, 2011) Recently, President
Obama re-emphasized this concern when he stated:
The risk that we’re especially concerned over right now is the lone wolf terrorist,
somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-scale massacres of
the sort we saw in Norway recently. You know, when you got one person who
is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and it’s
a lot harder to trace those lone wolves (CNN,2011).

Lone wolf terrorism involves violent acts by self-radicalized individuals designed
to promote a cause or belief. History is filled with examples of single individuals
engaged in assassinations or mass murder and who, though inspired by others, have acted
autonomously. This type of terrorism, long employed by extremist movements, owes
part of its origins to the writings of Mikail Bakunin and Sergey Nechaev of The People’s
Will, a Russian revolutionary group which championed the concept of “propaganda by
deed” in the middle of the 19th century (White, 2012). The “propaganda by deed,”
committed by a lone wolf terrorist, appears to have been resurrected in the latter half of
the 20th century by radical right-wing extremists, Islamic jihadists and others.
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Unlike group or network-sponsored terrorists, lone wolves have been extremely
difficult to identify or counter. Though lone wolves do not have the resources and
support available to other forms of terrorism, they also do not suffer from the liabilities
experienced by many of these groups. Though they usually are not capable of large scale
operations, they have emerged as a significant and increasingly lethal threat (Bakker and
de Graaf, 2010).
Self-Radicalization
Though lone wolf terrorists are self-radicalized, their motivation may not always
be political or religious. In some instances, they may be motivated by personal agendas in
response to some real or perceived organizational or institutional event. From 1940 to
1957, George Metesky terrorized New York City with 33 pipe bombs, of which 22
detonated, in response to having been injured while working for Consolidated Edison.
Known as the “Mad Bomber of New York,” Metesky’s reign of terror was finally ended
when he was arrested through one of the first successful applications of psychological
profiling (NPR, 2011). Likewise, from 1978 through 1995, Theodore Kaczynski, a neoluddite known as the unabomber, sent 16 bombs to universities and airlines (Alston,
2004).
The lone wolf terrorist concept emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as an outgrowth
of reactionary right-wing, anti-government activities (White, 2002). The neo-Nazi, antisemetic and anti-Black ideologies of The Order, Posse Comitatus, Identity Christian and
the Klu Klux Klan provided motivation for individual acts of terrorism not only by
groups, but also by un-affiliated individuals who were self-radicalized by their exposure
to teaching, writings and publications (Coates, 1987). Through Glaser’s process of
differential identification (Thio, 2010), some true believers (Hoffer,1951) took it upon
themselves to violently act upon these groups.
Single-issue protest groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the
Environmental Liberation Front (ELF), and anti-abortionist groups also have spawned a
number of lone wolf terrorist attackers. Because of their historic roots in Great Britain,
both ALF and ELF are international, leaderless resistance groups that have been engaged
in direct action. Both groups claim to be non-violent, but they both have been associated
with a number of single individual-type attacks which have resulted in extensive property
damage, especially in the United States. As a consequence, they have been placed on the
terrorist watch list by the Department of Homeland Security (Leader and Probst, 2011).
The anti-abortionist movement, however, has had a strong history of violent acts
committed by lone wolf operators, including the bombing of clinics and murders of a
number of health-care workers. Likewise, Eric Rudolph, most known for his Olympic
Park bombing in 1996, also bombed a number of abortion clinics (White, 2009).
The 1985 Seattle murder of the Goldmark family by David Lewis Rice
exemplifies this process of self-radicalization. His belief in the perceived threat of a
government/Zionist conspiracy to facilitate a communist invasion of the United States
had been fueled by his attendance at a number of presentations by the ultra-conservative
Duck Club in Seattle (Coates, 1987). Similar instances of lone wolf terrorism also
include Doris and David Young’s 1986 hostage bombing of a school in Cokeville,
Wyoming (Coates, 1987) and the 1999 Jewish Community Center attack by Buford
Furrow (Bakker and de Graaf,2010).
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The 1995 anti-government Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh, the
1996 Olympic and other bombings by Eric Rudolf, the 2002 shoe -bomb incident with
Richard Reid and the 2010 attempted Christmas tree bombing by Osman Mohamed in
Portland are other examples of lone wolf terrorist attacks (Homeland Security News:
2010). The 2009 Nidal Hasssan attack at Fort Hood and the 2009 attempted underwear
bomb attack on an American airliner by Umar Farouk Adulmutallab, as well as the recent
Oslo bombing and massacre by Ander Breivik reflect the fact that lone wolf terrorism is
not restricted to a single political or religious orientation (Pantucci, 2011).
The one thing that these various lone wolf terrorists have in common has been
their self-radicalization. Though a number of lone wolf terrorists have had some contact
with extremist groups, they have not committed themselves to continuous membership or
group involvement. Therefore, the majority of their identification and internalization has
taken place through secondary sources. Historically, books, writings and manifestos
were frequent sources of self-radicalization. In some cases an incident, such as the
standoff and final confrontation between the federal government and the Branch
Davidians in Waco, Texas or the event at Ruby Ridge, can radicalize an individual. More
recently, the advent of the internet has created a fertile environment for the selfradicalization of lone wolf terrorists by providing ideological justification and direction
from a distance. Nevertheless, self-radicalization is a matter of degree and may be
considered as one end of a continuum in the process of ideological commitment.
Leaderless Resistance
The concept of “leaderless resistance” is another important component of the lone
wolf terrorist. Louis Beam (1992), borrowing heavily from the racist, anti-government
novel, The Turner Diaries (Pierce/MacDonald, 1978), proposed the “leaderless
resistance” concept of a decentralized terror campaign conducted by independent
operators. Alex Curtis, another white supremacist, employed the internet and his
Nationalist Observer magazine to popularize the concept of the lone wolf terrorist (ADL,
2011). In 1993, Curtis encouraged other white supremacists to act alone in committing
violent acts so that they would not incriminate others. Curtis even posted on his web-site
a “Lone Wolf Points System” that awarded scores for assassinations based upon the
potential significance of the victims (ADL, 2011).
The concept of leaderless resistance also has been picked up as a tactical
component by a number of other groups. The Animal Liberation Front and the Earth
Liberation Front have stressed this concept as a part of their operational philosophies.
Carlos Marighella, the left-wing champion of urban terrorism in the 1960s, advocated this
policy in his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (1969).
Despite the tactical success of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 airline attacks, the growing
effectiveness of counterterrorism techniques has made the planning and conduct of
complex attacks increasingly more difficult. In 2003, an article by Osama bin Laden in
the jihadist internet forum “Sada al Jihad” encouraged Al Qaeda members to take action
without waiting for instructions (Bakker and de Graaf, 2010). Similarly, in 2006 Abu
Jihad al Masri circulated an article titled “How to Fight Alone”(Clemons, 2010) in
support of the concept of lone wolf terrorism..
The importance of personal jihad has been transformed by a number of Salafi
clerics, including Abu Musab al-Suri, from a religious revivalist concept to a tactical tool
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of terrorism, as in the case of the Fort Hood actions by Nidal Malik Hasan. Bruce
Hoffman, a noted counterterrorism theorist, has suggested:
This new strategy of Al Qaeda is to empower and motivate individuals to acts of violence
completely outside any terrorist chain of command. The nature of terrorism is changing,
and Major Hasan may be an example of that (Hoffman, 2010).

Hoffman also stated that “leaderless resistance” is the wave of the future. Though it
might be less lethal in each instance, lone wolf terrorism will be more difficult to combat
as there are fewer indicators to lead to its discovery (Hoffman, 2010).
The increasingly effective dissemination of extremist ideology has contributed to
the rise of the leaderless lone wolf terrorist. Individuals with extremist interests or
leanings are now easily self-educated and radicalized through the acquisition of not only
an ideology, but also justifications and tactics for its use. Leaderless resistance not only
mobilizes, it also provides inspiration for a single individual to become a leader by deed.
Chaos (single event) or Career (serial) Terrorism
Lone wolf terrorism can take either of two forms, chaos or career. Chaos lone
wolf terrorism is characterized by a single event in which the lone wolf appears as if from
nowhere and engages in a singular disruptive event. Suicide terrorism is a major form of
chaos lone wolf terrorism. A single event is planned and conducted in such a manner that
maximum impact in terms of casualties and/or public visibility is achieved. The
destruction of the Twin Towers in New York by Al Qaeda suicide terrorists is an
example of chaos terrorism with impact beyond the immediate casualties and destruction
through the public nature of the event and the role of the media as a force multiplier
(White, 2009). The Fort Hood Massacre by Major Nidal Hasan also is an example of
chaos terrorism by a lone wolf.
The lone wolf suicide terrorist, a form of ultimate altruism, not only damages a
target or target population, but also establishes the cause for which the terrorist sacrifices
his life as one worthy of great respect and even fear. As Pape (2005) noted in his study
of suicide bombing, this type of terrorism is very effective, difficult to deter, and is a
tactical tool designed to allow an individual or small group the ability to coerce a more
powerful foe. Bryn (2007) noted six important lessons concerning suicide terrorists: (1)
suicide bombers are not crazy; (2) it is mainly about politics and not religion; (3)
sometimes it’s strategic; (4) sometimes it’s retaliatory; (5) repression escalates attacks;
and (6) sometimes empathy with your enemy through the recognition that true grievances
must be addressed can reduce the root causes of suicide terrorism (Bryn, 2007). For the
most part, chaos or single event terrorism has been the domain of political and religious
extremists who consider their dramatic act as a valued sacrifice to a higher cause. In
many ways, chaos terrorism is very similar to mass murder. In most cases, a mass
murder episode ends with the murderer dying at the scene of a dramatic event (Thio,
2010).
Career or serial terrorism by a lone wolf operative usually involves a continuous
series of lower-level acts of violence over an extended period of time. Ted Zazinsky, the
unabomber, is an example of a career or serial lone wolf terrorist. As previously noted,
Kazinsky engaged in a mail bombing campaign that spanned almost 20 years that killed 3
people and injured more than two dozen others (Alston, 2004). Currently, a unabomber
copycat has been sending letter bombs to a series of nanotechnologists in Mexico (Lloyd
and Young, 2011).
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Lone wolf operatives engaged in career or serial terrorism see their violent
protests as a long-term strategy in which their survival is a prerequisite for the continued
visibility and viability of their campaign. This type of lone wolf terrorist has a strong
egoistic belief in his ability to continue to outsmart the agencies of control. In a sense,
they are gamers who seem to derive satisfaction from the contest as well as support for
the cause they advocate. Social profiles of serial lone wolf terrorists are quite similar to
those of serial killers, and that profile suggests that most lone wolf terrorists are relatively
normal, ordinary individuals. However, some researchers have noted that there may be
some factors that link the type of terrorism to certain types of individuals (White, 2010).
The social character of the serial lone wolf terrorist is often linked to personality
and social traits associated with other isolated individuals. They tend to be above
average in intelligence, self-centered and to some degree paranoid, especially in regard to
the forces of social control (Coates, 1987, White, 2010). Because of their need to justify
their extreme actions over an extended period of time, serial lone wolf terrorists often
create public justifications of their actions. For example, Ted Kazinsky published his
own manifesto and wrote frequent letters to the media denouncing technology. He stated,
“In order to get our message before the public…we had to kill people”(Artiga, 2011).
The internet has provided a ready forum for a number of lone wolf terrorists. Ander
Breivick, of the Oslo incident, also published a manifesto (internet), as did George
Metsky (self-published), the Mad Bomber of New York.
Consistent with the behavior of terrorist groups, lone wolves may not have been
direct victims of the actions of their target group. Nevertheless, lone wolves are
committed to correcting some perceived injustice befalling someone, whether that be the
environment, animals, unborn children, the white race or an ethnic or religious group.
Through “propaganda by deed” and “leaderless resistance,” lone wolves are motivated
not only to oppose an injustice but also to take action with force, thus becoming a hero in
the struggle (Artiga, 2011).
Terrorism, whether the single episode resulting in chaos and destruction or the
serial practice of smaller-scale ongoing attacks, is increasingly the result of the selfradicalized lone wolf committed to creating a public performance in support of a cause
(Braniff and Moghadam, 2012). Terrorism is drama in its most tragic form.
Other Typologies
Analysis of lone wolf terrorism can take a number of forms. These perspectives
provide different insights into a complex phenomenon. For example, Peter Phillips
(2011) employed game theory and utility analysis to develop a detailed mathematical
analysis of this form of terrorism. Using these economic models of behavior, he
developed an important series of first-order predictions. Phillips (2011) determined that,
depending upon the levels of risk-aversion or risk-seeking behavior, lone wolf terrorists
predominantly elect, in descending order, assassination, armed attacks, bombing, hostage
taking or other non-conventional attacks as their tactic of choice. He also noted that lone
wolves involved in successful serial attacks (in terms of fatalities) will often withdraw
from activity for a period of time. In summary, Phillips (2011) suggested that “the lone
wolf terrorist agent inhabits the boundary of orthodox economic analysis of terrorism.”
Phillips and Pohl (2011) further invoked economic models to develop a profile of
lone wolf offenders in response to emergent weaknesses that have been demonstrated in
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other instances of offender profiling. Specifically, they noted that an “important
advantage of the rational choice approach to offender profiling is its capability at
handling cognitive and behavioral factors as well as situational factors” (2011).
As a consequence of the rational choice model, Phillips and Pohl identify two
basic types of lone wolf terrorists, the risk-aversive and the risk-seeking individual. The
risk- aversive lone wolf terrorist is, in many cases, a part-time terrorist who engages in
low level acts of serial terrorism while also engaging in other, more legitimate, forms of
activism. Their statistical analyses of a number of lone wolf terrorist incidences
documented the fact that any alteration of the expected return due to law enforcement
action of increased security at possible targets may deter risk-aversive individuals from
pursuing their goals. Specifically, they note that these types of terrorists may space out
their illegitimate actions in both time and geographic location to minimize their potential
exposure and risk of capture (Phillips and Pohl, 2011). On the other hand, risk-seeking
lone wolves employ an alternative calculus placing higher value on the expected marginal
return in comparison to the potential threat of exposure and capture. In essence, the risk
is of as much importance, and possibly more so, than the cause or crusade.
Within the social sciences, the creation of typologies has facilitated the
identification of certain relevant categories that have contributed to enhanced
understanding of certain social phenomenon. However, typologies are methodological
constructs which, in fact, are arbitrary divisions of continuums of the phenomena under
investigation. Some typologies are one-dimensional and others are multi-dimensional.
An instance of a single-dimensional typology of lone wolf terrorism is the recent
example of risk-aversion and risk-seeking proposed by Phillips and Pohl (2011). Also, a
number of researchers have focused on motivation as the basis for a typology of lone
wolf terrorism. Lisa Andrews (2001) has identified a number of motivations for terrorist
actions: moral justification; religious conviction; social change; political antagonism;
revenge; attention; and symbolism. Others have suggested that lone wolves may be
motivated by ideological, social, psychological, political, monetary reasons, or in
response to coercion. Likewise, Artiga (2011) noted that lone wolves are motivated to (1)
send a message to policy makers, adversaries or supporters; (2) raise awareness for their
cause; (3) influence the political process; (4) instill fear; (5) destroy key or symbolic
infrastructure; and (6) correct a perceived injustice.
Hacker and Laqueur have debated the possibility of psychologically profiling
terrorists, including lone wolves. Hacker’s(1976) typology included criminals, crazies
and crusaders. On the other hand, Laqueur (1999) suggested that developing a composite
profile of terrorists is impossible because the complexity of contexts creates a multitude
of conditions conducive to the emergence of this type of violent response.
Multi-dimensional typologies of lone wolf terrorism involve two or more criterion
of categorization. White’s Tactical Typology of Terrorism, which looks at the type of
activity (criminal / political) , the level of terrorist activity, the type of activity and the
type of potential response by agents of social control, represents one of the more
successful multi-dimensional typologies of terrorism (White:2012).
Pantucci ‘s (2011) recent article, “A Typology of Lone Wolves: A Preliminary
Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists,” is one of the most complete and documented
reviews of self-radicalized, single terrorists operating within an environment of leaderless
resistance. This typology focuses on the means and context of self-radicalization, their
7

tactics of engagement and the framework of available support. Though the
documentation for this review was limited to Islamic jihadists, it does offer significant
potential for generalization to lone wolves across the spectrum of individual terrorist
action.
Pantucci (2011) has identified four basic lone Islamic terrorist types: the loner; the
lone wolf; the lone wolf pack; and the lone attacker. Loners are individuals who plan or
attempt to carry out an act of terrorism using the cover of extreme Islamist ideology.
Though they claim some adherence to radical Islamic beliefs, they do not have any ties
with extremists, except through what they can access through the passive consumption of
published or posted ideology. Pantucci (2011) suggests that they use radical Islam as a
cover for other social or psychological grievances that they wish to address through
violence. Lone wolves, on the other hand, while appearing to carry out individual actions
without any apparent actual outside instigation, have demonstrated some level of contact
or even training with operational extremists (2011). The lone wolf pack involves a small
cell of independently operating terrorists who have become self-radicalized (2011).
Though they have not become involved in a hierarchically controlled network, they
exhibit some direction and control through the public agendas of noted individuals or
groups, such as Al Qaeda or leaders such as Anwar al-Awlaki. Lone attackers, according
to Pantucci (2011), “operate alone but demonstrate clear command and control links with
Al Qaeda or affiliated groups.” In each instance, Pantucci categorizes his groups in terms
of the type of self-radicalization and degree of self command and control exhibited.
A General Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism
Lone wolf terrorism has been associated with a wide variety of causes. Today,
the headlines fluctuate from the jihadist-inspired assassin, the right-wing reactionary, the
ecologically adamant idealist or the moralistic right-to- life terrorist. However,
regardless of the ideological underpinnings of each expression of lone wolf terrorism, a
number of important characteristics appear relevant to their description and the
development of a general typology. For the purposes of this inquiry, four dimensions will
be employed in the development of a general model of lone wolf terrorism: extent of
radicalization, motivation, form and risk-awareness. These four dimensions create a
Rubik’s Cube type model of lone wolf terrorism.
The first dimension of this general model of lone wolf terrorism involves the
extent of involvement in the radicalization process. Self-radicalization is a basic
characteristic of the lone wolf terrorist, but the extent to which this process involves
personal development or socialization through external contacts is a critical difference
between types of lone wolves. Individual exposure to extremist ideology through
literature or web-sites is a characteristic of personal self-radicalization. However, other
lone wolves have had, to varying degrees, some organizational exposure and even
training. For example, Shahzad (Times Square bomber) admitted to having received
some financial support and training in demolitions from the Taliban in Pakistan
(Foxnews, 2010). Likewise, Richard Reid, the failed shoe bomber, admitted to personal
contact with Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person to date who has been convicted for the
September 11, 2001 attacks (CNN, 2009).
As previously noted, there have been numerous discussions of terrorist
motivation, particularly those related to the lone wolf operative. For analytic purposes,
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however, we can view the second dimensionon a Durkheimian continuum from egoistic
to altruistic (Timascheff, 1966). In some instances, the egoistic or self-centered lone wolf
terrorists may consider themselves above the constraints of the community and a specific
ideological organization. Though they may be cognizant of extremist books, literature or
web-sites, they manifest significant anti-social characteristics. Ted Kazinsky
(unabomber) and Timothy McVeigh (Oklahoma City bomber) were socially isolated
individuals who felt either individually “called” or uniquely capable of committing and
succeeding because of their belief in their self-superiority (Bates, 2011). However,
altruistic lone wolf terrorists are motivated more by a perceived obligation to a cause or
crusade. Nidal Hassan (Ft. Hood) and Faisal Shahzad (Times Square) justified their
actions as selfless acts indicative of their commitment to a greater cause.
The form of terrorism, whether chaos or career is the third dimension of this
general model. Obviously, a suicide bomber is a once-in- a-lifetime practitioner of
terrorism. Usually, the continuum between single event and serial terrorism is only
discernable after the fact. However, serial or career lone wolves may initially plan or
conduct a single event of terrorism, but if they are successful they may increasingly move
towards increased activity. Likewise, a career of minor acts of lone wolf action may
encourage an individual to seek a more definitive form of terrorism, culminating in a
dramatic, final act. A change in life events, increased fear of apprehension or
disappointment in the level of perceived effectiveness of previous actions may influence
this process (Hudson, 1999). This transformation process of serial terrorist to a dramatic
single event terrorist has been evident in many right-wing and single issue terrorists, as in
the cases of anti-abortion, animal rights or ecological violence.
The final dimension of this model is the degree of risk activity acceptable to the
lone wolf terrorist. Utilizing the continuum of risk-aversion to risk-seeking noted by
Phillips and Pohl (2011), lone wolf terrorists may be influenced by their willingness to
either seek or avoid the consequences associated with different acts of individual
terrorism. As a continuum, we have seen individuals who have increasingly engaged in
riskier acts. George Metzky’s increasingly detailed letters to public officials and Ted
Kazinsky’s letters and manifesto are examples of increased risk-taking behaviors. In
some ways, suicide bombers are the ultimate risk-seeking terrorists, but even in these
instances the selection of the targets and the degree to which they are protected reflect
different risk- versus-reward calculations. An attack on the Pentagon or a head of state is
more risk-seeking, in terms of potential success, than an attack in a mall.
This four-dimensional model provides a means to assess and indentify not only
various types of lone wolf terrorists, but also multiple factors that may help discern
conditions and causes that contribute to the emergence of this type of violence. As
Figure 1: indicates, lone wolf terrorism is a complex act. (The symbols in Figure 1 are
arbitrary indicators chosen to reflect the four different dimensions of the model.)
Motivation * *
Radicalization ---

Form + +
Risk # #
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(Figure 1.)
A General Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism
Motivation
(Altruistic)
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#
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(Self)
*
(Group)
#
*
+
#
*
+
*
+
#
*
Risk-Taking
*
Form - Career
Motivation
(Egoistic)
This multi-dimensional model allows for a large number of possible combinations of
various types of lone wolf terrorism. Obviously, a model with this many possibilities is
too complex for normal use, but the four dimensions contribute to a more complete
understanding of the more common types of lone wolf terrorism. For the purposes of this
presentation, only a few of the more common examples will be cited.
Single-issue causes, such as ecological, animal rights or anti-abortion actions,
have been associated with instances of lone wolf terrorism. Stern (2003) introduced the
concept of the lone wolf avenger, which exemplifies personally self-radicalized, egoistic,
serial, risk-aversive lone wolf terrorists like Ted Kazinsky. Kazinsky began to move
from risk-aversive to risk-seeking as he progressed through his series of letter bombs. By
sending a series of taunting letters and issuing a detailed manifesto, Kazinsky modified
his profile. Eric Rudolph, a serial bomber of abortion clinics and the Olympic Park
bombing, manifested a similar profile. Frequently, this type of individual is a socially
isolated loner who seeks to justify his actions through public justifications, seeking to
move from a personal egoistic agenda to one which is more altruistic. Because of the
level of social isolation and self-radicalization, the lone wolf avenger who is risk-aversive
will usually engage in a series of relatively small-scale isolated attacks. Risk-seeking
lone wolf avengers, on the other hand, will gravitate to more chaos-creating acts, such as
the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh. Jessica Stern, in her book Terror in
the Name of God, devotes an entire chapter (7) to describing the lone wolf avenger.
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The lone wolf vigilante is a self-radicalized, egoistic , risk-seeking, career
terrorist who pursues a series of personal confrontations. This individual sees himself as
responsible for maintaining compliance to the values and standards of some cause or
valued institution. An example of this type of lone wolf vigilante would be Bernard
Goetz, the New York subway avenger. Whitten (2007) notes that lone wolf vigilante is
often disorganized, easily caught or seeking martyrdom.
The lone wolf revenger is a self-radicalized, egoistic, risk-seeking and chaos
creating example of lone wolf terrorism. Chechen Black Widow local suicide bombers
who had been victims of Russian brutality, rape and the loss of their husbands and
children are one example. Though the ultimate goal of the Chechen revolution was
greater political autonomy, the Black Widows were engaged in a more personal form of
revenge terrorism (White, 2012). George Metesky, the Mad Bomber of New York,
exhibited a similar profile, with the exception that he practiced a more risk-aversion,
serial form of terrorism. The assassination of two U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan
as a result of the inadvertent burning of the Koran is another example of revenge
motivated lone wolf terrorism.
The lone wolf guerrilla is only marginally self-radicalized because he has
received some limited training or indoctrination. He identifies with a cause or belief
system to which he feels a strong sense of obedience and altruistic commitment.
However, as a fighter in a long-term conflict, he is a serial participant in risk-aversive
actions that will allow him to pursue his cause over an extended period of time. An
example of this type of practitioner may be found in the early stages of liberation
movements or during periods between active revolutions. This type of lone wolf terrorist
was associated with the Basque Separatist Movement (White, 2012). The frequent smallscale terrorist attacks experienced by American forces in Afghanistan in the rural tribal
areas is another example of this type of terrorist behavior engaged in by individual
Pashtuns who are not affiliated with either the Taliban or Al Qaeda, but are responding to
a cultural tradition to oppose any outside invader (Kilcullen, 2009).
On the other end of the continuum, the Ft. Hood attack by Major Nidal Hassan
reflected an assisted form of self-radicalization because of his online contact with the late
radical Mullah Anwar al-Awaki. Because of his commitment to a radical form of Islam,
Hassan manifested an altruistic motivational profile. Likewise, given the public nature of
his attack, it was both risk-seeking and a chaos-creating event. This profile is also similar
to many of the suicide or attempted suicide bombers, such as Richard Reid (shoe bomber)
and Umar Abdulmutallab (the underwear bomber). In many ways, these individuals
reflect a lone wolf guided missile profile.
These are a few examples of the types of lone wolf terrorists, but they provide
insights into the various dimensions and complexities that are associated with this
growing threat to security and safety. Future inquiries will allow the identification of
other profiles of lone wolf terrorists and provide opportunities to better understand the
prerequisites and precursors to the motivation and mobilization of lone wolf terrorism.
Conclusions
The literature and list of lone wolf terrorists will allow more examples of single
actor terrorism to be analyzed and contrasted through the four dimensions which
comprise this proposed General Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism. Through the lenses of
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radicalization, motivation, form and risk-awareness, we are able to build a broader
understanding of the elements which shape this emerging threat to social order. These
multi-dimensional profiles, however, are not specific realities and should not be reified as
a completely definitive statement on lone wolf terrorism. Building on the important
works of Pantucci, Phillips, Pohl, White and others, it is, however, a beginning for
understanding lone wolf terrorism and the social and psychological conditions that
establish environments conducive to its emergence and possibly as a means of identifying
areas of action and response to lessen this growing threat.
Today, terrorism takes many forms. However, the rise of the selfradicalized lone wolf terrorist has created an increasing dilemma in today’s
security environment. This type of emerging terrorism is increasingly found
among right-wing reactionaries and religiously radicalized jihadists. With
increasingly effective security environments, leaderless resistance has emerged as
a threat and tactic facilitated by the internet and other modern information outlets.
The unabomber, Oklahoma City bomber, Fort Hood and Oslo assailants are
examples of this new form of terrorist. Through the development of a
sociologically informed typology that categorizes lone wolf terrorism in terms of
motivation, extent of radicalization, form, and risk-awareness, a more relevant
understanding of this form of non-normative behavior is proposed.
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